False Data Injection Attack Detection and Mitigation Using Nonlinear Autoregressive Exogenous Input-Based Observers in Distributed Control for DC Microgrid
Authors: Md Abu Taher; Milad Behnamfar; Arif I. Sarwat; Mohd Tariq
Abstract:
DC microgrids are instrumental in modern energy systems, offering transformative benefits that revolutionize energy distribution, improve efficiency, and enhance reliability. Their adaptability and versatility render them suitable for various applications, from providing sustainable energy solutions to remote communities to supporting critical infrastructure in urban environments. Integration of solar and wind power-based renewable sources positions dc microgrids as key players in reducing carbon emissions and mitigating environmental impact. Operating independently or within larger grids, they contribute to smart and resilient energy ecosystems, adapting effectively to evolving needs. Distributed secondary control, employing cooperative or consensus-based algorithms, marks a paradigm shift in microgrid stability. This decentralized approach fosters collaboration among local controllers, enhancing adaptability, resilience, and dynamic responsiveness. By efficiently managing distributed energy resources (DERs) through cooperative control mechanisms, microgrids optimize performance in dynamic conditions. The communication network, modeled using graph theory, underpins distributed secondary control, facilitating information exchange among controllers. This graphical representation enables the identification of optimal data transmission paths and detection of communication bottlenecks, enhancing efficiency and resilience. Within microgrid control systems, the cyber-physical system (CPS) integrates computational elements with physical processes, enabling real-time monitoring, communication, and control. Understanding CPS intricacies is crucial for safeguarding microgrid integrity and security. Despite these advancements, microgrids face cyber threats, such as false data injection attacks (FDIA), replay attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and stealthy attacks and environmental adversaries, and jeopardizing stability and reliability. FDIA, particularly subtle, manipulate critical sensor data to deceive controllers without immediate detection. Replay attacks disrupt normal operation by intercepting and retransmitting legitimate signals, while DoS attacks overwhelm communication networks, leading to delays and breakdowns. Stealthy attacks persist undetected, posing ongoing threats to microgrid operations. Addressing these challenges is vital for ensuring microgrid security and reliability in an increasingly interconnected energy landscape.
